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  Contemporary research and writing being undertaken in the genre of evolutionary 
economics can be viewed as part of a broader, more catholic intellectual movement, one that I 
would characterize as a quest for historical social science.  Yet, a decade after it began to be 
trendy among economists to say that ‘history matters’, some things remain less than entirely 
clear about the possible meanings attached to that phrase, if indeed it is taken to carry any 
substantive content at all. For me, at least, the expression ‘history matters’ does carry a quite 
precise set of connotations, namely those associated closely with the concept of path 
dependence. The latter refers to a property of contingent, non-reversible dynamic processes, 
including a wide array of processes that can properly be described as ‘evolutionary’. The set of 
ideas associated with path dependence consquently must occupy a central place in the future, 
historical social science that economics should become. 
 
  However, by now you may well have begun to wonder whether the matter of history 
mattering really has been greatly clarified by my tying it to a second catchy expression that, 
unfortunately like the first, has come to be invoked more frequently than it is defined. What is 
‘path dependence’ anyway? Does it have a meaning more precise than the slogan: ‘history 
matters’? Is it about ‘the Economics of QWERTY’ or about something more general?  If we 
were to conduct a systematic survey, even one confined to the academic economics profession, 
it probably would confirm my casual impression that the rising popularity of the term ‘path 
dependence’ has spawned a variety of usages, a perceptible measure of confusion, and even 
some outright misinformation.
2 If there are few who are prepared to dissent from the assertion 
that ‘history matters’, there are more who wonder whether history matters in ways that are 
important for economists to think about, and, there are many more who hold diverse and 
sometimes contradictory notions of how it comes about that history matters.  
  
  My immediate task on this occasion, therefore, is to try to clarify the meaning and 
amplify the economic significance of ‘path dependence’. My hope is that the results of such an 
undertaking will enable others better to appreciate some of the salient implications for our 
discipline of recovering a conceptualization of change as a process that is historical, including 
implications for the way economic policy analysis is approached. A task so simple to describe, 
however, is not necessarily so easy to perform. For one thing, much of the training of the 
modern economist tends to weaken the receipients’ natural, intuitive understanding of historical 
causation. Consequently, some remedial work is required in addressing an audience of 
academic economists, many of whose members’ advanced education will have left them 
severely incapacitated in this particular regard.  
 
  To put this differently, most of us have been well-schooled in working with 
mathematical economic models whose dynamics admit perfect reversibility and lack any strong 
sense of genetic causation. It strikes me that neither those economists who casually assign to 
the influence of ‘history’ the things for which their analysis does not adequately account, nor 
those sceptics who say ‘Sure, history matters, but not for much’, are adequately responding to 
the challenges posed by the quite different class of dynamic processes that generate sequences 
of causally related events. One of the things about ‘events’ that our everyday experience of 
change seems to confirm is that they happen – and never ‘un-happen’. By contrast with the  
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realities of the world around us, recognition of which forces itself implicitly and often only 
incompletely into the consciousness of practicing economic advisors, much of the formal 
teaching of economic analysis refers to a very different and special class of dynamic processes 
in which all motion in the long run is ‘continuous locomotion’. In the context of analytical 
structures of that kind, which are familiar enough to students of classical mechanics, ‘change’ 
may be said to occur without there being any specific, individual ‘events’ that have causal 
significance. 
 
  To abandon the learned habits of peering at the world of economics automatically and 
exclusively from the peculiar vantage point afforded by a certain and now certainly antiquated 
branch of physics, and to be able therefore to take up another and contrary perspective, cannot 
be simply a matter of un-learning. Something additional, and for many, something new has to 
be learned. That ‘something’ can stand alongside neoclassical economic analysis, and so 
enhance one's appreciation of the special features distinguishing that paradigm from what may 
be called historical economics. 
 
  In asserting that ‘history matters’ I do not maintain that in economic processes history 
always matters in the same ways. Nor would I contend that economic processes have worked in 
the same way throughout history. The issue of how much ‘importance’ should be attached to 
the particular category of path dependent dynamical processes, in the sense of what proportion 
of the changes occurring in the economy around us can best be understood in such terms, 
remains for me one that can must be addressed by empirical inquiries. But, like virtually all 
interesting empirical questions, this one cannot be resolved in an analytical vacuum. The very 
nature of the evidence that would be required to address it is prescribed by reference to 
alternative, analytical and statistical models that admit of historical changes that are path 
dependent, and changes that are path independent. Data acquire meaning only in the context of 
economic theory: as T.S. Ashton, the British economic historian, said long ago: ‘the facts do 
not wear their hearts on their sleeves’. 
 
  To say that is not to diminish the value of ‘mere facts’, nor to dilute the force of the 
imperative to get details of the story straight. Examination of particular cases may serve to 
illustrate the phenomenon of path dependence, to exemplify one or another methodology of 
studying historical economics, and to identify and explore unresolved problems. The writing of 
a piece of economic history in this way may also be good fun, and, when it is well done it 
typically manages both to provide entertainment and to satisfy particular points of curiosity. To 
do it well, however, we must begin with some grasp of the conceptual issues and the theoretical 
framework that endows observations with meaning and import. 
 
  Therefore, on this occasion I am not going to delve into the details of selected historical 
cases, whether illustrative of the evolution of technologies, or of institutions and organizational 
forms, or of cultural beliefs. Historical economics needs greater investment in suitable theory, 
and the kind of theory that is required is harder than that upon which ahistorical economics has 
been able to rest. So I must ask that you forego for the present the enjoyment of another 
excursion into economic history, and, instead, attend more closely to the conceptual 
foundations that serve to underpin further researches into path dependence in the economy. 
There will be an ancillary benefit in following this course: by anchoring our discussions firmly 
on these foundations with the aid of some precise definitions of path dependence (in section 2), 
it is quite straightforward to dispose of the misleading presentations of the concept by sceptics 
and critics.
3  I can then proceed (in section 3) to try clearing up the confusion that has 
developed in the literature over the connection between path dependence and economic  
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inefficiency, before turning (in section 4) to take up the meaning and economic significance of 
the widely used term ‘lock-in’. 
 
   After this necessary clearing of obscuring ‘undergrowth’ it will be seen (in section 5) 
that once we enter an explicitly dynamic framework, the questions of static welfare ‘efficiency’ 
and the meaning of ‘market failure’ become more complicated and involve subtle issues that 
the critics of path dependence have thus far failed to take on board. Moreover, the implications 
of path dependence for economic policy studies are in reality quite far reaching, in arguing for 
the abandonment of static welfare-analytic approaches to the problem of where government 
should intervene in the economy, and its replacement by explicitly dynamic analysis that asks 
whether ‘now’ is the time in this or that specific market. Moreover, the general thrust of the 
recommendations regarding issues of technology policy that emerge from considerations of 
path dependence, will more often than not turn out to be entirely opposite in nature to those that 
seem to be most worrisome to the concept’s laissez-faire critics.  
 
  In sum, I am unable to find any compelling reasons why economic analysis should 
remain ‘locked in’ to an ahistorical conceptual framework, apart from the unfortunate 
hysteresis effects of ‘intellectual sunk costs’. But those effects are real, and must be countered. 
Therefore, drawing upon the analogy offered by field models of physical systems that have 
multiple basins of attraction, I suggest (in section 6) that some injection of further, intellectual 
‘energy’ is likely to be necessary in order for our discipline to free itself from the local region 
of ‘low potential’ in which it has too long remained trapped.    
 
  
2. Almost everything you wanted to know about ‘path dependence’  – but were always 
afraid to ask 
 
  Path-dependence, as I wish to use the term, refers to a dynamic property of allocative 
processes. It may be defined either with regard to the relationship between the process 
dynamics and the outcome(s) to which it converges, or the limiting probability distribution of 
the stochastic process under consideration. 
 
   At the most intuitive level we may draw a distinction between dynamic processes that 
are path dependent, and the rest. The latter, path-independent processes, may be said to include 
those whose dynamics guarantee convergence to a unique, globally stable equilibrium 
configuration; or, in the case of stochastic systems, those for which there exists an invariant 
(stationary) asymptotic probability distribution that is continuous over the entire feasible space 
of outcomes  – that is, a limiting distribution that is continuous over all the states that are 
compatible with the energy of the system. 
  
   Stochastic systems possessing the latter properties are said to be ergodic, and have the 
ability eventually to shake free from the influence of their past state(s). In physics, ergodic 
systems are said to be connected, in the sense that it is possible to transit directly or indirectly 
between any arbitrarily chosen pair of states, and hence, eventually, to reach all the states from 
any one of them. 
 
  Path dependent processes thus may be defined negatively, as belonging to the class of 
exceptions from the foregoing set of processes, in which the details of the history of the 
systems’ motion do not matter – because they cannot affect its asymptotic distribution among 
the states. This leads us immediately to  
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   A negative definition: Processes that are non-ergodic, and thus unable to shake free 
of their history, are said to yield path dependent outcomes. 
 
  In this connection, it may be worthwhile to notice that the familiar homogeneous 
Markov chain invoked in many applications in economics – models of population migration 
and spatial distribution, of income and wealth, and occupational and social status distributions, 
firm size distribution, and so forth – is characterized by an invariant set of state-dependent 
transition probabilities that are finite (positive), and for convenience in many applications 
contexts, are specified so as to ensure that the process is ergodic. The distributions of the 
individuals or firms whose motions among the states are governed by Markov chains of this 
kind will each converge to their respective, invariant asymptotic probability distribution – a 
distribution that is continuous over the entire feasible state space. (This unique limiting 
distribution is the one that emerges as the transition matrix operator is repeatedly iterated.) 
When there is an absorbing state or subset of connected states (from which the probability of 
escape to the subset of transient states is zero), the system will converge weakly to that single 
attractor. Obviously, such a system’s behaviour is not deterministic, but it may be said to be 
‘pre-destined’, in the sense of being governed from the outset by a unique asymptotic 
probability distribution.  
   
  However, when a state-dependent process has two or more absorbing subsets (that is, 
distinct regions of equilibria that are locally stable), the homogeneous Markov process becomes 
non-ergodic, and its outcomes can be said to be path dependent. In the trivial case in which the 
initial condition of the system was one or the other of the absorbing states, it is plain that 
whatever governed that selection would fix the limiting position of the system. Further, it is no 
less self-evident that if there is at least one transient (non-absorbing) state from which the 
multiplicity of absorbing states can be reached, directly or indirectly, then the realization of the 
random process at that point in the system’s history (on its path) will select one rather than the 
other outcome(s) to which the system eventually must converge. 
 
  For many purposes, however, we would like to say what a path dependent process is, 
rather than what it is not. Help from the probability theorists can be invoked in order to do so in 
a precise way. Focusing upon the limiting patterns generated by a random process (thus 
characterizing a dynamic system), we have 
  
A positive definition:  A path dependent stochastic process is one whose 
asymptotic distribution evolves as a consequence (function of) the process’s 
own history. 
 
  This broader definition explicitly takes in processes that possess a multiplicity  of 
asymptotic distributions, as generally is the case for branching processes – where the 
prevailing probabilities of transitions among states are functions of the sequence of past 
transient states that the system has visited. Branching processes that are subject to local 
irreversibilities share the property of non-ergodicity. The latter therefore characterizes the 
processes of biological evolution, because speciation constitutes a non-reversible event.  
  
  Transition probabilities that are not invariant functions of the current state are also the 
characteristic feature of so-called non-homogeneous Markov chains. Rather confusingly, 
however, probability theorists sometimes refer to the latter as having path dependent transition  
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probabilities, thereby contrasting them with the more familiar class of homogeneous (or first 
order) Markov chains whose transition probabilities are (current) state dependent.
4 But, as has 
been seen from the negative definition discussed above, path dependence of the transition 
probabilities is not a necessary condition for a process that generates path dependent outcomes. 
  
  The foregoing account of what the term ‘path dependence’ means may now be 
compared with the rather different ways in which it has come to be explicitly and implicitly 
defined in some parts of the economics literature. For the moment we may put aside all of the 
many instances in which the phrases ‘history matters’ and ‘path dependence’ are simply 
interchanged, so that some loose and general connotations are suggested without actually 
defining either term. Unfortunately much of the non-technical literature seems bent upon 
avoiding explicit definitions, resorting either to analogies, or to the description of a syndrome – 
the set of phenomena with whose occurrences the writers associate path dependence. Rather 
than telling you what path dependence is, they tell you some of the symptomology – things that 
may, or must happen when the condition is present. It is rather like saying that the common 
cold is sneezing, watering eyes and a runny nose. I can illustrate this with the following two 
passages: 
 
Path dependence is the application to economic systems of an intellectual 
movement that has lately come into fashion in several academic disciplines. In 
physics and mathematics, the related idea is called chaos – sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. As chaos theory has it, a hurricane off the 
coast of Florida may be the fault of a butterfly flapping its wings in the Sahara. 
In biology the related idea is called contingency – the irreversible character of 
natural selection. Contingency implies that fitness is only a relative notion: 
survival is not of the fittest possible, but only of the fittest that happen to be 
around at the time. (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995c, p. 33) 
 
Elsewhere, the same authors propose a kindred explanation, albeit one that is slightly more 
formal:  
 
The use of path dependence in economics is, for the most part, loosely 
analogous to this mathematical construction: Allocations chosen today exhibit 
memory; they are conditioned on past decisions. It is where such a 
mathematical process exhibits ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’, 
where past allocations exhibit a controlling influence, that it corresponds most 
closely to the concerns that economists and others have raised as problems of 
path dependency [sic]. In such a case, ‘insignificant events’ or very small 
differences among conditions are magnified, bringing about very different 
outcomes. It is that circumstance that yields both the ‘non-predictability’ and 
‘potential inefficiency’... (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995b, p. 210) 
 
Much could be said about the inaccuracies in the texts just quoted. For the present, however, it 
will be sufficient to notice one thing that they do not say, and three things that they do say. 
 
That path dependence is a property of stochastic sequential processes is not mentioned, 
and only the allusion to ‘contingency’ provides any hint of the subject’s probabilistic context. 
Of course, in order to pick up this clue, one would need to suppress the extraneous and 
misleading surmise that ‘contingency’ has a meaning that is specific to (evolutionary) biology, 
where it ‘implies’ something about the nature of selections made on criteria of inclusive  
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fitness.
5 Even that slender clue, however, is disguised by the statements that would have us 
associate path dependence with deterministic chaos, and the property of ‘sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions’ which characterizes that class of dynamic systems. The coupling of path 
dependence with chaos constitutes the first of the three positive assertions to which I previously 
referred, and it is incorrect. What it reflects is a too common predilection among mainstream 
economic writers for transposing concepts and arguments that are probabilistic in nature into 
simple deterministic models.
6 This habit is often seriously misleading, and must be especially 
so where neither certainty equivalence nor the operation of the central limit theorem of 
probability can legitimately be presupposed. 
 
The second and third assertions disclose the authors’ reasons why path dependence 
should be denounced as a problematic departure from the economic mainstream. They allege 
that a dynamic system in which there is ‘memory’ will be unpredictable, and worse, that it will 
be characterized by a potential for generating inefficient resource allocations. Like the first of 
the triad of assertions, these too are simply incorrect. There are some classes of non-ergodic 
stochastic processes whose outcomes are predictable, and I shall say more about these in due 
course. Further, it is vitally important to insist on logically distinguishing between systems that 
have the general property of path dependence, and that special sub-category of non-ergodic 
dynamic systems that may display (as an additional attribute) a susceptibility to one or another 
form of ‘market failure’.  
 
The latter condition, of course, is the one that adherents of strict neoclassical orthodoxy 
seem to find especially troublesome. Although I partake in the interest that most modern 
economists show regarding the efficiency of economic resource allocation, an obsession with 
the spectre of inefficiency was not what motivated me to inject the notion of path dependence 
into wide economic discourse, or to associate it with the application of insights from formal 
models of non-ergodic stochastic processes. This confession ought not to come as a surprise, 
especially to those who have encountered material that I have published before and since the 
pair of essays in which Clio, the muse of History, was coupled with the emergence of 
QWERTY as the de facto standard for typewriter keyboards (David 1985, and 1986). 
 
The concept of path dependence and the associated framework of analysis is anchored 
in my long-standing quest to integrate historicity into economics. I think it important to 
distinguish between that peculiar aim, and the broader objectives of the ‘new economic history’ 
movement during the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the wholesale importation of the apparatus 
of modern economic analysis and econometric techniques into the study of economic history. 
Although the use of the economist’s preferred methods of study of the past, undoubtedly has 
proved extremely illuminating in many contexts, it had become evident to some within the field 
that new constraints and analytical contradictions had been created by trying to understand 
economic history – which is to say ‘economic dynamics’ – through the assiduous application of 
ahistorical concepts and tools. It was the prospect of resolving those problems within the 
framework of path dependence that made the latter attractive from my vantage point. Imagine, 
then, my utter surprise to find this approach being attacked as a rival paradigm of economic 
analysis, whose only relevance consisted in the degree to which it could be held to represent a 
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3. Significance: does path dependence mean there will be inextricable 
inefficiencies? 
 
Welcome to the world of path dependence, a world governed not by our stars, 
not by ourselves, but by insignificant accidents of history. In this unpredictable 
world, small seemingly inconsequential decisions lead inexorably to 
uncontrollable consequences....In the world of path dependence...our 
expectations for market outcomes are turned upside down. The Invisible Hand 
does not work in the world of path dependence. (Liebowitz and Margolis 
1995c, p. 33) 
 
This passage, from the article ‘Policy and path dependence – from QWERTY to Windows 95’, 
published in the Cato Institute’s journal Regulation, ironically describes what is purported to be 
the essential message of those propounding the concept of path dependence. It is the authors’ 
general contention that path dependence really cannot hold much interest for economists, 
because the world of market economies does not conform to the one that they construe the 
concept to be describing; because remedies for unsatisfactory situations generally will be 
available, and found quickly by profit-hungry entrepreneurs attracted by the potential ‘surplus’ 
that is implicit in any seriously inefficient state of affairs. Hence, on this reasoning, the only 
sorts of path dependent phenomena which would warrant the attention of economists must be 
extremely rare occurrences. 
 
  But, as has been seen, the core content of the concept of path dependence as a dynamic 
property refers to the idea of history as an irreversible branching process. One must logically 
distinguish from this the idea that it is possible that some branchings are ‘regrettable’ because 
they created inextricable inefficiencies that, in some counter-factual but equally feasible world, 
could have been avoided. Moreover, it is plainly a mistake to impute to the economic theory of 
path dependence as such the set of propositions that underlie the second of these ideas, for the 
notion of market failure has been long established in the literature of welfare economics. 
 
  Actually, it is within the context of static general equilibrium analysis that economists 
developed the concept of ‘market failure’ – namely, that the Pareto optimality of allocations 
arrived at via atomistically competitive markets is not guaranteed except under a stringent set of 
convexity conditions on production and preference sets; and, further, it requires the existence of 
markets for all extant and contingent commodities. One may or may not accept the usefulness 
for pragmatic policy purposes of defining ‘market failure’ in a way that takes those conditions 
as a reference ideal. Analytically, however, it remains a total non sequitur to assert that the 
essence of path dependence – a property defined for analyses of dynamical and stochastic 
processes – consists in asserting propositions regarding the possibility of ‘market failure’ that 
were proved first in the context of purely static and deterministic models. 
 
  Quite the contrary proposition holds: under full convexity conditions a non-
tatonnement general equilibrium process can be shown to converge in a strictly path dependent 
manner on one among the continuum of valid ‘core’ solutions which satisfy the criterion of 
Pareto optimality (see Fisher 1983, and David 1997b). This should be sufficient to expose the 
logical error of claiming that the essential difference between models of path dependence and 
standard neoclassical analysis must be the former's insistence on the presence of ‘market 
failure’. To be sure, there are some underlying connections between the existence of conditions 
that give rise to path dependence in economic processes, and the possibility that the workings 
of competitive markets in those circumstances would result in allocations that are inefficient.  
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But the circumstances in which competitive markets will not yield Pareto efficient outcomes 
are not in themselves either new, or arcane.  
 
  It might then be noticed that the taxonomy of path dependence proposed by Liebowitz 
and Margolis (1995b), and curiously described as ‘definitions of path dependence’, embraces a 
classificatory principle that is based entirely on static optimality criteria. Inasmuch as such 
criteria remain conceptually orthogonal to the nature of the dynamical processes under 
consideration, it is perhaps not surprising to observe that the definitions offered by Liebowitz 
and Margolis for ‘first-degree’ and ‘second-degree’ path dependence do not actually serve to 
distinguish between dynamic systems that are path independent and those that are path 
dependent. The first-degree form describes a situation in which all the outcomes among which 
selections might be made are not Pareto-ranked, such as would exist for the Nash equilbria of in 
a pure coordination game; the second-degree situation is one in which the outcome realized is 
dominated by a feasible alternative, yet represents the unavoidable ex post consequence of 
having taken an action that ex ante represented the ‘best’ strategy.
7  
 
  In discussing the conceptualization of third-degree path dependence in which there is 
market failure leading to inefficiencies of an ‘irremediable’ kind, Liebowitz and Margolis 
(1995b) make reference to the test of ‘remediability’ suggested by Oliver E. Williamson. But, 
they entirely omit mention of the important distinction that Williamson’s (1993) work drew 
between remediability through ‘private ordering’ and through ‘public ordering’. Nowhere in the 
literature dealing with theoretical and empirical aspects of path dependent economic 
phenomena have I found it said that this property leads to outcomes for which remediation via 
public ordering is wholly infeasible. For the state to undertake to ‘correct’ a market outcome 
might become socially inefficient. But that is a different proposition from its being simply 
infeasible. So, it is not open to the critics to claim that path dependence would have empirical 
or policy substance for economists if only it did not exclude the possibility of remediation by 
public ordering in those circumstances where private ordering was unworkable.
8 
 
  One certainly must agree that among economists at large most of the interest in path 
dependence results from the possibilities that sub-optimal equilibria will be ‘selected’ by a 
dynamic process. So it is understandable (and certainly to be expected) that brief treatments of 
points of controversy concerning theoretical contentions and empirical ‘evidence’ would tend 
to focus upon that question to the exclusion of everything else. Nevertheless, there is more to 
economic life than the possibility of welfare losses due to static inefficiencies. The identities of 
winners and losers in market rivalries is of interest to the owners and employees of the 
enterprises involved. The structure of industry itself may be of significance for dynamic 
efficiency through innovation and entrepreneurship. Indeed, the intense recent interest of the 
business press (and the Justice Department) in the positions of Microsoft and its present and 
future rivals in the market for web-browsers and related software, makes it plain that something 
more is perceived to be at stake than the comparative social rates of return on further 
incremental investment in their respective product lines. 
 
   More generally, all manner of political and social sequelae, as well as questions of 
equity, are attached to the dynamics governing the evolution of income and wealth 
distributions, and processes of socio-economic stratification. If analysis of positive feedback 
mechanisms that affect those aspects of life would significantly enhance economists’ abilities 
to understand and predict the path dependent phenomena arising therein, does that not warrant 
at least some notice in assessment of the conceptual framework’s significance? 
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4. The meaning of ‘lock-in’ in the historical context of path dependence 
 
  The current state of imprecision and confusion in discussions of the meaning and 
significance of the term ‘lock-in’ has not been alleviated by the use of ‘lock in’ as one among 
the taxonomic criteria applied to classify path dependent processes in the recent work of 
Professors Liebowitz and Margolis. Quite the reverse. I must begin by reiterating some doubts 
as to the coherence of creating a taxonomy for path dependent economic processes that turns 
upon whether or not it is possible to imagine a system being inextricably ‘locked in’ to a state 
that is locally and globally dominated by other allocative arrangements. Yet the latter would 
appear to be the very condition that is indicated, when the term is taken by Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1994, 1995b, 1995c) to refer to a situation where all the participating agents know 
they would derive a net gain by arranging by whatever means were necessary, collectively to 
exchange the status quo for some other available configuration. 
 
  By ‘net gain’, in this definition, is meant a surplus over and above the full costs of 
organizing and implementing the move to another state. Ex hypothesis there will be sufficient 
surplus in the new state to compensate everyone and leave someone better off after absorbing 
all the costs of negotiation, mechanism design, and insuring credible commitment that may be 
required to implement a collective escape. Therefore, in the circumstances thus posited, one 
would be hard put indeed to see how, if the agents involved were economically rational 
individuals, the status quo could have persisted long enough to be of interest. What is there in 
the imagined situation that would serve to lock in anyone to so unstable an attractor? Either we 
accept that people behave rationally and that such situations will be as scarce as hens’ teeth, or 
this is a rendering of the notion of lock-in that would oblige economists to acknowledge that 
sometimes history that really matters is a result of the workings of the mysterious, the 
irrational, or the wildly improbable forces in economic life – or possibly all three. 
 
  By contrast, as the term ‘lock-in’ has been used in my work and that of Arthur (1989), 
it simply is a vivid way to describe the entry of a system into a trapping region – the basin of 
attraction that surrounds a locally (or globally) stable equilibrium. When a dynamic economic 
system enters such a region, it cannot escape except through the intervention of some external 
force, or shock, that alters its configuration or transforms the underlying structural relationships 
among the agents. Path dependent systems – which have a multiplicity of possible equilibria 
among which event-contingent selections can occur – may thus become locked in to attractors 
that are optimal, or that are just as good as any others in the feasible set, or that take paths 
leading to places everyone would wish to have been able to avoid, once they have arrived there.  
 
  From this vantage point, Arthur’s (1989) phrase ‘lock-in by small historical events’ is 
evidently a gloss that should not be read too literally; it is a convenient contraction of the 
foregoing reference to the way in which trapping regions may be entered – although somewhat 
unfortunate, in allowing a hasty reader to suppose that the antecedent events somehow have 
created the local stability, or locked-in state. To be more precise, albeit more cumbersome, one 
should say that such configurations are self-sustaining (Nash) equilibria; that in the case of a 
path dependent process some particular historical event caused – that is, initiated the sequence 
of transitions that effectively selected, one rather than another among such configurations to be 
realized as the system’s emergent property. 
 
   In some circumstances, as in the case of pure coordination games (where there are 
strategic complementarities in the dynamic interactions among agents) there is no Pareto- 
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ranking of a multiplicity of available equilibria from amongst which a path dependent, 
branching process can make a selection. Which coordination point is reached is a matter of 
welfare indifference to the parties involved.  A coordination equilibrium, thus, provides us with 
the paradigmatic situation in which individuals are content to remain doing something, even 
though they would be happier doing something else if everybody would also do that other thing 
too. The reason they don’t change what they are doing is, generically, that there are information 
imperfections that make it unlikely that a decentralized process can get everyone coordinated to 
move elsewhere, collectively.
9 Now notice that while incomplete information may be critical in 
blocking spontaneous escapes from dominated coordination equilibria, it is not a necessary 
condition for decentralized market processes to select such states. This is another reason why 
presenting ‘lock-in’ as a particular (pernicious, and supposedly uncommon) form of ‘path 
dependence’ is an invitation to further analytical confusions.  
  
   This last, important point can be elaborated on by observing that the generic problems 
of escaping from lock-in of the system to a globally inferior (but locally stable) attractor are 
rooted in ‘pure’ coordination costs. Such costs may be very high, however, especially if the 
individual agents are expected to act spontaneously under conditions of incomplete 
information. Hence, the nature of the ex post coordination problem generally is not the same as 
the problem of arranging coordination with agents who do not yet exist, or who have yet to 
recognize the complementaries between their interests and capabilities and those initiating the 
action. The sources of ex ante market failure that allow the system to be led into a globally 
inferior equilibrium are not necessarily the ones that make it very hard to get out. 
 
  Of course, if and when the structure of economic incentives and constraints bearing 
upon the process under study is altered by events that, for the purposes of the analysis may 
reasonably be regarded as ‘exogenous innovations’ (in the state of relevant knowledge, or in the 
regulatory institutional regime), the previous attractor(s) may be destroyed, freeing the system 
to endogenously begin to evolve some new configurations. Thus, the advent of microwave 
transmission technologies in the 1950s may be seen to have undermined the prevailing 
regulatory regime governing the US telecommunications industry (which had itself emerged 
through a path dependent process); and the denouement, in the event of the AT&T divestiture, 
brought into being a liberalized regulatory regime and new market structure that may be said to 
have formed new ‘attractive paths’, for the evolution of digital telecommunications 
technologies. But to claim that the evidence of change itself is sufficient to dispose of the 
notion of a persisting inefficient lock-in is tantamount to supposing that Schumpeter’s gale of 
‘creative destruction’ is blowing continuously at full force, through every niche, nook and 
cranny of the economy. Indeed, it is a way of losing one’s sense of the variations in the flow of 
events through time that makes it interesting to read histories. 
 
  Strategic re-definitions, playing with words to avoid the force of the concepts with 
which they were originally associated, is a form of rhetoric that is essentially obscurantist. By 
the purely semantic trick of re-defining path dependence to come in various degrees of 
seriousness, and by associating the most ‘serious’ form to be, not a process, but a particular 
outcome state gauged in terms of allocational efficiency, it is possible to give superficial 
plausibility to the claim that no serious economic consequences are associated with the 
phenomenon of path dependence. This has been the taxonomic gambit tried by Professors 
Liebowitz and Margolis, who reserve their ‘most serious’ form of path dependence (third-
degree) to be the state in which the status quo is Pareto-dominated even after all transition and 
adjustment costs are considered. They then can ask, rhetorically, why should one suppose that 
we would ever find a situation of ‘serious path dependence’, where people refused to make  
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themselves individually and collectively better off, after paying all the bargaining, transactions 
and information costs of arranging their escape from a bad situation?  Why indeed? If one 
insists that the only sort of sub-optimality worth worrying about is the kind so wasteful as to 
justify escaping at any finite cost, then one is implicitly accepting the actual or equivalent loss 
of all the remedial expenditures (the costs of undoing the effects of outcomes we collectively 
prefer not to live with). Yet, those remedial expenditures might not have been unavoidable ex 
ante.  Is it not pertinent for economists advising private and public agencies to consider the 
likelihood that some substantial portion of those costs were consequences of the path 
dependence of the dynamic process through which ‘regrettable’ outcomes were ‘selected’? 
 
  Suppose, for the moment, that the significant economic question to be addressed in 
regard to the possibility of ‘lock-in’ is this: How can we identify situations in which it is likely 
that at some future time individuals really would be better off had another equilibrium been 
selected ab initio?  By that we must mean that an alternative outcome would be preferred in 
some collective sense (perhaps by application of a compensation test) to the one that they are 
now in, and that they also (collectively) should be ready to incur some substantial costs to 
rectify the situation – assuming it was feasible to do so. Were it possible to answer that 
question by saying that such conditions will never obtain, then economists could well afford not 
to bother with the distinction between dynamic processes whose outcomes were path dependent 
and those which were path independent. It would be a distinction that might interest students of 
history, but would otherwise be inconsequential for economic policy. But such would be true 
only if multiple equilibria could be shown never to exist outside the context of pure 
coordination games (that is, where none are Pareto-dominated), or if it could be shown that it 
would never be possible to identify the structural conditions that give rise to other multiple 
equilibrium situations. We have no impossibility theorems of this sort, and neither of these 
propositions is likely to be established empirically.  
 
 
5. Path-constrained melioration, the burdens of counterfactual historical analysis, and 
some policy implications 
 
   There is, however, another way to look at the question. It may be that the selection of 
Pareto-dominated equilibria in positive feedback systems is never allowed to become serious 
enough (in the Liebowitz-Margolis sense) to impress the contemporary observer who can 
imagine clever, if costly, mechanisms for organizing collective escapes from locally sub-
optimal situations. This, indeed, is a cogent point, and deserves closer attention than it usually 
receives from economists who challenge the champions of historical economics to look around 
and find a ‘really important’ example – by which they seem to mean, a case of path dependent 
dynamics leading to a grossly inefficient equilibrium. Instead of imagining that history is 
played out without anybody noticing what is happening, and then, when an equilibrium appears 
to be reached people gather round and assess its optimality, we must allow for the process to 
encompass possibilities and consequences of incremental path-constrained meliorating actions 
being taken by observant, intelligent agents. 
 
  The static framework of welfare analysis within which too many economists are still 
being taught to do their thinking tends to suppress the natural disposition to conceptualize the 
whole flow of current economic life as contingent upon the results of antecedent choices. Seen 
in truly historical perspective, a great deal of human ingenuity, especially the sort that is said to 
be ‘mothered by necessity’, is devoted to trying to cope with ‘mistakes’ that are threatening to 
become ‘serious’ in their economic consequences; to assuring, somehow, that their more  
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pernicious effects will be moderated, if not abated altogether.  This is done ex post, by 
contriving technological ‘fixes’ and ‘patches’, by commandeering temporary task forces to 
handle emergencies that established organizational structures are discovered to be handling 
badly, by sustained efforts at ‘reforming’ (not reinventing) long-standing institutions, and, yes, 
by concerted educational campaigns to untrain people who have acquired dysfunctional habits 
of one sort or another. 
 
  We like to refer to all of that activity as ‘progress’ and, in a historically local sense, that 
is just what it is: melioration. But the meliorative options are more often than not quite tightly 
bounded by the existing critical situation: it is the existing software code that threatened to 
malfunction badly when the year 2000 dawned, not some other programs and data formats that 
were not implemented, although they might well have been trivial to modify. The resources 
spent in such perceived loss-avoidance activities are part of what we are happy to consider 
productive investments, adding to the net product, whereas some part of it could equally well 
be thought of as the deferred costs of regrettable decisions made in haste to be remedied at 
leisure, and sometimes for great profit. They might equally be called regrettable economic 
opportunities (see David 1999). 
 
  Most of the situations in which the discomforts of remaining in a bad coordination 
equilibrium could be really large are those in which the institution, or technology, or 
behavioural norm has become highly elaborated and deeply embedded in numerous activities 
throughout the economy. One must then contemplate a counter-factual world in which the 
whole general equilibrium course of evolution would have been very different. Consideration 
of the implications of general purpose technologies is one of the ways in which economists 
today are coming to grips with this sort of systems analysis. Little wonder that economic 
historians have been and should be concerned primarily with such questions. 
 
  In considering the nature of the policy lessons that might be drawn from the foregoing 
view of the incremental evolutionary development of complex technological systems, some 
remarks on the putative role played by ‘historical accidents’ in path dependent processes are 
now very much in order. Unfortunately, the use of that phrase itself is prone to cause 
misunderstandings. It is quite misleading to take it to suggest that some original economic 
irrationality, or implementation error (accident) must be implicated whenever we find that 
positive network externalities have given rise to a sequence that turned out to be other than a 
globally optimal path. Indeed, only those who are hostile to the very idea of path dependence 
would repeatedly insist upon a literal interpretation of the phrase ‘accidents of history’. Doing 
so suggests that the essential feature of such processes is that the original actors in the drama – 
whether as contributors to the design of a technical system, or an institutional rule structure, or 
a particular form of business organization, or as the initial adopters of such innovations – had to 
have been acting arbitrarily, or irrationally in the context of their economic circumstances. Such 
an interpretation is not only logically unwarranted; it obfuscates an important but widely 
overlooked feature common to the histories of many network technologies, and one that has 
some bearing upon the way public policy might be approached in that area. 
  
  The facts of all the technological instances recently under re-examination – QWERTY, 
640K lower memory in the IMB PC, AC vs. DC electrical current, light-water reactors, and 
VCR formats too – are quite consistent with the view that the behaviour of the initiating actors 
of the drama, generally, was quite deliberate (not at all random in the sense of remaining 
inexplicable to the historian), and furthermore reasonably conformable to the urgings of the 
profit motive. Yet, generally, their actions were also bounded by a parochial and myopic  
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conception of the process in which they were engaging – in the sense that these decision agents 
were not concerned with whether the larger system that might (and was) being built around 
what they were doing would be optimized by their choice.
10 In most cases they can be held to 
have failed entirely to foresee the complementary innovations and investments that would be 
influenced by their initial commitment to one rather than another course of action. In other 
words, their failure of imagination took the form of not thinking systemically about the 
technological and industrial structures that they were engaged in developing. Thomas Edison, 
of course, being a systems inventor par excellence, was an exception in that particular regard; 
yet, as has been shown by David (1991, 1992c), Edison’s business strategy in the context of the 
‘Battle of the Systems’ – including his sudden decision to withdraw from the flourishing 
electrical supply systems industry altogether – appears to have been driven by quite different, 
rather myopic, but nonetheless rational economic considerations. 
 
  In general, what were difficult for the pioneers in any area to foresee were the 
complementaries that would emerge subsequently, and in so doing open the possibilities of 
developing a more complex, distributed system whose components were not produced or 
purchased integrally. The Remington Co. engineers who put the finishing touches on the first 
commercially successful typewriters to carry QWERTY into the world did not dream of the 
possibility of touch-typing manuals; Edison had not anticipated that anyone would devise an 
efficient and economical converter to link DC electrical supply facilities with distant users by 
way of polyphase AC networks. Similarly, in more modern times, neither of the rival vendor 
groups behind the Sony Betamax and VHS cassette formats in the early VCR market had 
anticipated the commercial importance of pre-recorded movies and video rental stores.
11 Nor 
were the IBM engineers in Texas, as they rushed to create a readily producible personal 
computer, concerned with the amount of random access memory that would be needed to load a 
word-processing program like WordPerfect whilst keeping an Excel spreadsheet and a LAN-
modem open and running in the background. 
 
  The point here is not that these folks ought to have seen the shape of the future. Rather 
it is that the shape of the larger systems that evolved was built upon their work, and thus in 
each case preserved, and was in some respects much constrained by it – even in the way that 
they coped with the legacies of those initial decisions, taken quite deliberately, but with quite 
other and in some measure more evanescent considerations in mind. 
 
  From the foregoing it may be seen that a proper understanding of path-dependence, and 
of the possibilities of externalities leading to market failure, is not without interesting 
implications for economic policy. But those are not at all the sorts of glib conclusions that some 
critics have alleged must follow if one believes that history really matters – namely, that 
government should try to pick winners rather than let markets make mistakes. Quite the 
contrary, as I began trying to make clear more than a decade ago.
12 One thing that public policy 
could do is to try to delay the market from committing to the future inextricably, before enough 
information has been obtained about the likely technical or organizational and legal 
implications, of an early, precedent-setting decision. 
 
  In other words, preserving open options for a longer period than impatient market 
agents would wish is the generic wisdom that history has to offer to public policy makers, in all 
the applications areas where positive feedback processes are likely to be preponderant over 
negative feedbacks. Numerous dynamic strategies can and have been suggested as ways of 
implementing this approach in various, specific contexts where public sector action is readily 
feasible. Still more sensible and practical approaches will be found if economists cease their  
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exclusive obsession with traditional questions of static welfare analysis and, instead of 
pronouncing on the issue of where state intervention would be justified in the economy, start to 
ask what kind of public actions would be most appropriate to take at different points in the 
evolution of a given market process. 
  
  The ‘first best’ public policy role in these matters, therefore, is not necessarily the 
making of positive choices, but instead the improvement of the informational state in which 
choices can be made by private parties and government agencies. In the context of the recent 
literature on sunk cost hysteresis and options theory, one may see that the more history matters 
– because complementaries create irreversibilities in resource commitments – the more 
worthwhile it is to invest in being better informed prior to leaping. There is an evident 
opportunity cost in giving priority to investments in further information acquisition; quite 
standard economics can be relied on to balance the expected value of waiting (searching) for 
further ‘news’, against the anticipated costs to the current generation(s) of not allowing markets 
to make choices on the basis of the knowledge that is presently available. Obviously, some 
assessment of the rate at which the relevant information states are capable of evolving will turn 
out to be of critical importance in determining when a stage has been reached where it no 
longer is best to defer irreversible resource commitments. 
   
 
6. Overcoming ‘intellectual sunk cost hysteresis’ and escaping from disciplinary  ‘lock-in’ 
to ahistoricism 
  
  The cluster of ideas that are now identified with the concept of path dependence in 
economic and other social processes probably would not excite such attention, nor require so 
much explication, were it not for the extended prior investment of intellectual resources in 
developing economics as an ahistorical system of thought. For many economists, their own 
costs sunk in mastering that discipline have produced a facility for reasoning that suppresses 
natural, human intuitions about historical causation. They thus have a ‘learned incapacity’ (in 
Thorstein Veblen’s apt phrase) to see how historical events could exert a causal influence upon 
subsequent outcomes that would be economically important. Perhaps unknowingly, such folk 
have fully internalized Aristotle’s teleological principle of explanation, which rejected the 
method of reference to antecedents, and so escaped infinite explanatory regress by substituting 
forward-looking functionalism (as we would describe it). This was undoubtedly useful, even 
though it has had the intellectual side effect, in many disciplines, of encouraging the formal 
suppression of the intuitive impulse to refer to pre-existing states and intervening ‘events’ when 
asked to account for the way things are today. 
  
  Mainstream economics is not alone among the social sciences in providing a way to 
explain an existing state of the world by reference to the purpose or end (telos) that it serves, 
rather than to the conditions from which it may have evolved.
13 This has proved a source of 
deep insights into many matters, but not into all matters of concern to economists and students 
of broader cultural phenomena, such as the spread of languages and social communication 
norms.
14 Nor, for that matter, does it suffice to provide good accounts of biological phenomena. 
In modern Darwinian evolutionary theory there is a beautiful, productive tension between the 
teleological principle of natural selection according to inclusive fitness, and the antecedents 
principle, namely, that the possibilities of evolution are tightly constrained at every moment by 
the current contents of the gene pool, which is the product of species’ history. Perhaps that is 
why we might be drawn towards evolutionary biology as ‘the Mecca for economics’. 
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  Modern economics in its ahistorical, convergence model formulation serves some 
intellectual purposes very well, and the perpetuation of the methodological status quo can be 
seen to serve still other rational private ends. Nevertheless, if that style of explanation was 
entirely satisfactory in accounting for all economic and social phenomena without reference to 
legacies from the past, some of us would not presently be so exercised by trying to adjust 
contemporary economic thinking to the notion that history matters – nor would others be 
strenuously resisting that adjustment. Path dependence is a concept requiring explication for 
many today, simply because so much of economics committed itself to theories that would 
make the results of choice behaviours consistent in the sense of being path independent. But 
there is no compelling reason to regard that as an exclusive commitment. 
 
  Path dependence, at least to my way of thinking, is therefore about much more than the 
processes of technological change, or institutional evolution, or hysteresis effects and unit roots 
in macroeconomic growth. The concepts associated with this term have implications for 
epistemology, for the sociology of knowledge, and cognitive science as well.
15 Nevertheless, it 
would be quite wrong to imagine that positive feedback dominates all aspects of economic life 
(let alone ‘life’), just as it is unwarranted to proceed on the supposition that economic dynamics 
everywhere are intrinsically characterized by the operation of stabilizing, negative feedback 
systems. Considering the possibility that the former framework is the one most relevant in a 
particular context does not rule out the opposite conclusion, or preclude appropriate resort to 
the latter framework – the familiar convergence models of neoclassical economics. These really 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive tool-sets, or incompatible standards, that cannot be 
integrated into a larger intellectual system. Even though we should be aware of the workings of 
strong social processes, familiar in the sociology of knowledge, that can turn normal science 
procedures into exclusionary dogmas, it is not necessary for social and behavioural scientists to 
adopt positions that exacerbate and amplify those tendencies. 
 
  Once the concept and the ideas surrounding path dependence are properly understood, 
there can be no reason to construe them as necessarily corrupting the discipline of economics, 
or to fear that once admitted they would be subversive of all laissez-faire policies. There simply 
are no good grounds to go on actively resisting these ideas, which if accepted will lead us into 
previously little-explored regions of theoretical and empirical enquiry. Nor is there even a 
sound precautionary case for seeking to contain their spread until it can be determined what 
would become of the grand edifice of economic analysis as we know it, once the assumed 
global dominance of negative feedback processes were discarded. The logic of sunk cost 
hysteresis has a legitimate place in the conventional theory of optimal investment behaviour. 
Yet, when it is carried over and applied to the field of intellectual investments in new tools of 
economic analysis, the result is a self-defeating orthodoxy of thought and surely not the optimal 
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ENDNOTES 
                         
1 I am grateful for the pithy comments that I received on a related earlier paper (David 1997b), from 
Avner Greif, Frank Hahn, Joel Mokyr, Robert Solow, Edward Steinmueller and Gavin Wright. Stavros 
Ioannides contributed very helpful editorial corrections. None among them should be held responsible for 
the deficiencies or excesses that remain in the present text.  
2 I hesitate to write ‘dis-information’ at this point, as that connotes intentions rather than consequences. I 
prefer to proceed on the supposition that those who have repeatedly misrepresented the meaning of the 
term in the course of criticizing ‘path dependence’ as an erroneous economic theory, and those who have 
deemed it to be an empty concept (in the sense that it is essentially devoid of empirical relevance for 
economists), simply are confused about its meaning. 
3 For this purpose it is best that I confront the critical treatment of path dependence by Professors Stanley 
Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis (1995b, 1995c). I therefore put to one side a rebuttal of the specific 
factual allegations that have been adduced in Liebowitz and Margolis’s (1990) riposte to the story of 
QWERTY as related in David (1985, 1986). That attack has recently been cited by Ruttan (1997), who 
refers to the emblematic tale of QWERTY as ‘the founding myth of the path dependence literature’ 
(emphasis added). Although Liebowitz and Margolis fail to substantiate their contention that QWERTY 
simply is ‘a fable,’ their rhetorical strategy of attacking that case as though it constituted the only 
economically interesting exemplar of path dependence, managed to raise a small cloud of doubt regarding 
the empirical significance of the more general phenomenon. On the latter issue, however, see David 
(1999) for another view.  
4 Liebowitz and Margolis (1995b: pp. 209-210) fall into just this confusion on the one occasion on which 
they offer a formal definition of the meaning of ‘path dependence’. They say, correctly: ‘The meaning 
closest to current use in economics is that of stochastic processes that incorporate some concept of 
memory.’ But, thereupon they draw from the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1987) the following definition of ‘path dependence’: Letting P(n) be the probability of event 
E(n) =A(1) on the n-th trial, and (1-P(n)) be the probability of the mutual exclusive outcome E(n) = A(2), 
then the general ‘response probability’ for the sequential process is: P(n+1)=f{P(n), E(n), E(n-1),...,E(1)}. 
When the function f = f {P(n), E(n), E(n-1),..., E(n-d)}, the response probability is said to be ‘d-trial path 
dependent’. In the special case where d=0 it is ‘path independent’.  
The text in Liebowitz and Margolis (1995b: p.210) then goes on to assert, quite erroneously: 
‘The use of path dependence in economics is, for the most part, loosely analogous to this mathematical 
construction: Allocations chosen today exhibit memory; they are conditioned on past decisions.’ One 
should notice that if ‘allocations’ are associated with ‘events’, E(i), and (probabilistic) decisions at 
moment n are characterized by the pairs [P(n); 1- P(n)], then the foregoing statement does not correspond 
to the mathematical construction of ‘d-trial path dependence’, any more than the latter corresponds to the 
generic usage of the concept of path dependence by David (1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, et seq.), or by Arthur 
(1988, 1989, 1990, 1994), by Cowan (1991, 1996), by Durlauf (1990, 1996), Krugman (1991, 1994), and 
others contriibuting to the economics literature.  
 
5 The reference in the passage quoted to ‘contingency’ as the conceptual counterpart in biology of the idea 
of path dependence is followed by Liebowitz and Margolis’s (1995b: p. 33) statement that ‘In Wonderful 
Life, Stephen J. Gould applies this intellectual revolution to paleontology.’ But, it should be shiningly 
clear from that work by Gould (1989: pp. 282ff, esp.), and really no less from his earlier writings, that he 
is not drawing upon a recent intellectual revolution: ‘I regard Charles Darwin as the greatest of all 
historical scientists. Not only did he develop convincing evidence for evolution as the coordinating 
principle of life’s history, but he also chose as a conscious theme for all his writings...the development of 
a different but equally rigorous methodology for historical science. Historical explanations take the form 
of narrative: E, the phenomenon to be explained, arose because D came before, preceded by C, B, and A. 
If any of these earlier stages had not occurred, or had transpired in a different way, then E would not exist 
(or would be present in a substantially altered form, E’, requiring a different explanation....I am not  
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speaking of randomness (for E had to arise, as a consequence of A through D), but of the central principle 
of all history – contingency’ ( Gould, 1989: pp. 282-3). Further on, Gould (1989: pp. 283-4) writes of the 
universal psychological appeal of the notion of historical contingency, in terms that leave no doubt that 
this is not a concept specific to evolutionary biology: ‘Historical explanations are endlessly fascinating in 
themselves, in many ways more intriguing to the human psyche than the inexorable consequences of 
nature’s laws....Contingency is the affirmation of control by immediate events over destiny....Contingency 
is a license to participate in history, and our psyche responds. The theme of contingency, so poorly 
understood and explored by science, has long been a mainstay of literature....Tolstoy’s theme in all his 
great novels.’ What Gould provides in Wonderful Life is a new interpretation of the record of life left in 
the Burgess Shale, but, as he takes pains to acknowledge, this interpretation ‘is rooted in contingency’ – a 
very old and far from revolutionary idea.  
6 The practice can be employed with potent rhetorical effect on an unsophisticated audience, because the 
deterministic reformulation may then be subjected to criticisms from which the original analysis would be 
immune. A striking instance of such a switch is to be found in Liebowitz and Margolis’s (1995b: pp. 214-
15) reproduction and critique of a deterministic payoff tableau, used by Arthur (1989) purely as a 
heuristic device – to convey the possibility that a sequence of myopic adoption decisions under increasing 
returns to adoption could result in the commitment of the ensemble of adopters to a dominated outcome. 
In the course of pointing out that the payoff tableau may be read in a way that is inconsistent with the 
results reported for Arthur’s stochastic model, there appears the following commendably candid footnote 
(pp. 214-15, n. 15): ‘Actually, Arthur states that this example does not exhibit any ‘non-ergodicity’, 
meaning that it is not path dependent in the sense that small differences in historical sequences play a role 
in the final equilibrium. In this example the end result is the same no matter the order of initial 
participants. But it illustrates lock-in very well.’ I might note that this footnote is the only place I have 
found in Liebowitz and Margolis’s publications on path dependence where the concept is explicitly 
defined with reference to non-ergodicity, and even so the passage omits explicit reference to probability. 
7 Furthermore, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995b) offer a description of ‘third-degree’ path dependence that 
would apply equally to deterministic chaos – which, as was noted above, the authors correctly 
acknowledged to be not really the same thing as path dependence. 
8 This, however, would seem to leave Liebowitz and Margolis in the position of having to insist that 
economists should not attach real importance to path dependence because its ‘third-degree’ form ignores 
the reality that, even when remediation would not occur via ‘private ordering’, it would most likely be 
achievable through ‘public ordering’. That is hardly what one expects from defenders of laissez-faire.  
9 For discussion of this in the context of technical compatibility standards, see, for example, David and 
Greenstein (1990b); on social conventions, organizational routines and formal institutions, David (1994c), 
and David (1994d). 
10 See, for example, David (1987, 1990); David and Bunn (1988), Cowan (1991).  
11 Compare the detailed analyses of the VHS market in Baba and Imai (1990), Cusumano, Mylonadis and 
Rosenbloom (1992) and Grindley (1992), none among which are noticed in Liebowitz and Margolis 
(1994), or by the latter authors’ subsequent references to this case. 
12  Especially in David (1987), David and Bunn (1988), David and Greenstein (1990) and, most 
forthrightly in David (1992b).  
13 See David (1993b) for more on the teleological mode of analysis in economics. 
14 For further discussion of the latter topics, see, for example, David (1993a, 1994c), David and Foray 
(1993d, 1994d).  
 
25   
25 
                                                                        
15  On these epistemological topics, see, for example, the stochastic models discussed in David and 
Sanderson (1997), and David (1998b, 2000).  